Abstract
The Bowles-Simpson tax reforms make sense, but nothing about tax reform is politically easy.
Published in International Economy, Winter 2012: pp 49-50
Were it not for the growth in spending on Medicare,
Medicaid, and Social Security, the United States
wouldn't have much of a budget problem. The two
biggest programs—Social Security and Medicare—are
retirement programs that are extremely popular politically.
Both need to be reformed, but they cannot be cut abruptly
and they cannot be cut drastically. Consequently, it's hard
to avoid concluding that some revenue increases will be
needed to solve our fiscal problems.
Once that need is accepted, we have to ask, "What
kind of revenue increases?" The least desirable approach
would raise income tax rates in the current system without
fixing its complications, inefficiencies, and inequities. If
raising rates is rejected, we must either create a new tax—
such as a value-added tax or an energy tax—or design a
significant, revenue-raising tax reform.
A VAT or an energy tax is probably a nonstarter politically.
Republicans see a new tax as a money machine that
would finance a much larger government. Democrats worry
about the complexity of making such taxes sufficiently progressive
The Bowles-Simpson presidential fiscal commission
showed that there are income tax reforms that can raise
revenues progressively and efficiently. In one option, they
got rid of a host of special tax provisions while limiting, but
not eliminating, some of the most politically sensitive, such
as the charitable and mortgage-interest deductions. That
allowed them to lower the top rate for individuals to 28
percent while still raising $80 billion more in 2015. With
three rates—12.7 percent, 21 percent, and 28 percent—the
top 0.1 percent of the income distribution lost 11.8 percent
of its after-tax income and the top 1 percent lost 7.8 percent.
The middle three quintiles lost less than 2 percent.
Erskine Bowles and Alan Simpson achieved a high
degree of progressivity by taxing capital gains and dividends
at ordinary income tax rates. That imposes a very
high double tax on corporate profits. A more radical option
would limit the double tax by integrating the corporate and
individual tax systems. An even more radical change would
move toward a progressive consumption tax. Capital gains
and dividends wouldn't be taxed if reinvested, but would be
hit if used to finance consumption.
None of this discussion implies that radical tax reform
is easy. The revenue-neutral reforms of 1986 were anything
but. A revenue-raising reform greatly increases the
ratio of losers to winners. Accomplishing reform seems
easy only when compared to persuading Americans to
accept a VAT or new energy tax.
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